Network architectures embed governance design choices in code, protocols, and platform design in ways that demand constitutional thinking. The problem of constraining authority in protocol-coordinated digital orders can be clarified through considering code as governance, the comparative analysis of procedural constraints in centralized platforms versus architectural constraints in distributed networks, the constitutional political economy of blockchain protocol design, polycentric governance dynamics, and the role of exit and forking as constitutional mechanisms. Based upon these diverse literatures, Alston argues that distributed network governance creates dynamic fidelity, a structural property whereby the mechanical distribution of protocol update authority among independent classes of actors (validators, developers, users, and complementors) produces emergent checks and balances analogous to constitutional separation of powers. In such distributedly-governed network contexts, protocol-level commitments are thus more credibly entrenched than they would be under concentrated authority. This entrenchment, reinforced by the architectural auditability of protocol-coordinated governance, is both a constraint on discretionary change and a source of coordination value, because the credibility of commitments embedded in protocol depends on their durability and observability. As human activity is increasingly intermediated via network protocols that implicate not only economic exchange but also associative, expressive, and politically significant activities, the architecture of these protocols and how authority to change them is allocated implicates a broader set of rights whose protection benefits from the commitment credibility that competitively and constitutionally constrained network architectures provide.